As pointed out (and worked on a touch) in one of @awesomekling's latest videos, we need to start sanitizing pointers.

One method is to directly cut out all of the code that prints pointers, however then we will have a harder time debugging stuff.

Another method is to have a preprocessor definition (something like SANITIZE_KERNEL_POINTERS) and wrap preprocessor statements around pointer-printing code.

A third method is to do something like what linux does:

The %pK format specifier is designed to hide exposed kernel pointers,
specifically via /proc interfaces.  Exposing these pointers provides an
easy target for kernel write vulnerabilities, since they reveal the
locations of writable structures containing easily triggerable function
pointers.  The behavior of %pK depends on the kptr_restrict sysctl.

If kptr_restrict is set to 0, no deviation from the standard %p behavior
occurs.  If kptr_restrict is set to 1, the default, if the current user
(intended to be a reader via seq_printf(), etc.) does not have CAP_SYSLOG
(currently in the LSM tree), kernel pointers using %pK are printed as 0's.
 If kptr_restrict is set to 2, kernel pointers using %pK are printed as
0's regardless of privileges.  Replacing with 0's was chosen over the
default "(null)", which cannot be parsed by userland %p, which expects
"(nil)".

There are probably other methods of doing this, each with their own pros-cons. But I think this is something that will need to be done for the future 😄